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How do communities improve the health of their popu-
lations? For the past century, we have not been required 
to think deeply about the question because health status 
steadily improved. Life expectancy increased by 30 years 
in prosperous countries between 1900 and 2000. But now 
the question is emerging as one of the most important we 
face. The rate of “natural” improvement in health status 
appears to be slowing, and decline is not unthinkable if the 
sharp rise in the prevalence of chronic conditions such as 
obesity and type 2 diabetes continues unabated. Research 
identifying  the  nonmedical  determinants  of  health  has 
flourished  in  recent  decades.  The  correlations  are  well 
understood, but the causes of health disparities and the 
extent to which they can be mitigated remain debatable. 
How do societies come to take population health improve-
ment seriously? One potential pathway is incentives.
Some Sobering Realities
Improving  health  care  is  hard;  improving  population 
health  is  even  harder,  as  the  articles  in  this  issue  of 
Preventing Chronic Disease discuss. Decades of analysis 
and experimentation have confirmed the following:
1.   Targets  can  be  useful  but  also  distracting  and 
unintentionally destructive to the population health 
agenda (1).
2.   Little evidence supports the proposition that popula-
tion health can be improved with resources freed up by 
making health care more effective and efficient (2).
3.   Pay for performance, so attractive in theory, is fraught 
with difficulties in practice, among them methodologic 
problems and moral hazard. As typically understood 
and deployed, the concept may be particularly inimical 
to a population health agenda (3).
4.   Health status variability is inevitable, but even people 
who are born with identical health status will have 
diverse outcomes over the life course because of cir-
cumstances and choices. Moreover, establishing cau-
sation is elusive because of the complexity of factors 
that affect the health of both people and communities 
and the danger of being seduced by ecological fallacies. 
Some also argue, more controversially, that if health 
is to improve, we must give up other social goods; the 
laws of scarcity apply, and there is no positive-sum 
scenario (4).
5.   Experiences  in  other  sectors  reveal  the  mixed  and 
sometimes unforeseeable effect of incentives. In educa-
tion they have worked in some instances but have also 
resulted in perverse behaviors (eg, gaming, adverse 
selection). Creating effective incentives for particular 
circumstances is challenging, ensuring that the incen-
tives evolve as circumstances change even more so. 
Many jurisdictions have abandoned merit pay schemes 
for teachers, and the effect of teacher certification pro-
grams appears to have been modest. In health care, 
a  combination  of  high-quality  comparative  evidence 
and incentives is insufficient to achieve the desired 
practices  and  outcomes  (5).  Producing  effective  and 
durable reward systems is difficult in health care, and 
more difficult still in population health (6).
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6.   Some  policies  could  plausibly  improve  population 
health  if  applied  more  vigorously.  Some  effective 
programs fail not because of their inherent logic and 
structure  but  because  of  low  uptake.  For  example, 
67% of people who are eligible for food stamps are not 
enrolled  in  the  program  (7).  Performance  measures 
and  rankings  can  create  awareness  and  a  grow-
ing sense of responsibility for addressing population 
health needs and inequalities. However, it is impor-
tant to sort out whether community health status is 
a dependent variable (based on how well systems and 
programs perform), an independent variable (based on 
need), or both (8).
What Is to Be Done?
Notwithstanding  these  methodologic  challenges,  a 
thread of optimism runs through the incentives articles. 
Some authors propose that as the evidence gets stronger 
and more compelling, policy makers will eventually do the 
right thing. Knowledge about population health inequali-
ties  is  deep  and  diverse,  but  links  between  policies  or 
incentives and population health outcomes are not well 
documented. The implicit argument is that a critical mass 
of demonstration projects, evaluations, and case studies 
will  ultimately  have  the  intended  effect  on  politics  and 
society, and change will occur.
Unfortunately,  there  is  reason  for  skepticism.  If  we 
conceive  of  population  health  improvement  in  terms 
of  reduced  disparities,  benefits  must  increasingly  con-
centrate  on  populations  of  low  socioeconomic  status. 
Experience suggests that narrowing disparities is extraor-
dinarily  difficult.  We  are  limited  in  our  understanding 
of the factors that produce better population health, but 
evidence suggests that societies with less inequality are 
healthier (9). The problem is not that we have no clue 
about  how  to  improve  population  health  or  that  people 
oppose improving the health of disadvantaged populations 
in principle. The problem is that there is no strong politi-
cal commitment to the pursuit of these aims, no political 
liability inherent in not achieving them, and no consensus 
that this goal should be pursued more ardently than other 
goals (that may actually exacerbate inequalities). The sci-
ences of epidemiology and biostatistics explain the nature, 
extent, and consequences of population health inequali-
ties, but we must look to the political arts to understand 
why they are so hard to mitigate.
At  the  heart  of  the  political  dilemma  is  the  reality 
that population health improvement is but one of many 
competing  values.  Individuals  and  communities  steeply 
discount  future  health  benefits,  and  population  health 
improvement is a long, winding process whose ultimate 
benefits may take decades to quantify. A similarly steep 
discount applies to saving or improving anonymous, aggre-
gate lives compared with individual lives with names and 
faces. A third factor that steepens the discount rate is that 
society  values  health  gains  attributable  to  health  care 
interventions more than those achieved through social and 
economic policies and interventions. In a political context, 
how health is improved matters as much as whether it is 
improved — or so it would seem, judging from our enor-
mous  investment  in  health  care  that  delivers  virtually 
zero at the margins, and from the beggaring of investment 
in nonmedical improvement strategies.
A  large  public  has  been  persuaded  of  the  value  of 
increasingly  specialized  and  sophisticated  health  care 
and health technology, despite the clear absence of effect 
on  health  status.  This  symbolic  and  empirical  devotion 
to health care is a formidable challenge to a population 
health agenda. In Canada, we could eliminate poverty (as 
defined by Statistics Canada’s low-income cutoff) for $25 
billion  annually  (10)  —  about  20%  of  publicly  financed 
health care spending. No one is in favor of poverty, but 
political sentiment does not favor reallocating any part of 
health care spending to its elimination.
If  this  analysis  is  plausible,  it  follows  that  generat-
ing  broader  political  commitment  to  population  health 
improvement has to appeal to democratically shared and 
expressed  values  that  can  be  converted  into  a  feasible 
political agenda. But should this case be cast in terms of 
population health and disparities reduction as the goal of 
policy, or as the happy effect of the pursuit of other objec-
tives  such  as  economic  productivity,  reduction  in  crime 
and  social  problems,  international  competitiveness,  and 
general well-being? The Canadian Index of Wellbeing (11) 
has been developed to introduce concepts and measures of 
societal performance that are more meaningful and com-
prehensive than economically focused measures such as 
gross domestic product.
We  should  not  overlook  the  potential  contribution  of 
accountants.  The  costs  of  disparities  are  enormous  (eg, 
poorly  educated  and  therefore  unproductive  citizens; 
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of health care that may be ineffective; safety surveillance 
systems). If voters, particularly the middle class, can be 
persuaded  to  endorse  policies  that  enhance  population 
health, governments may respond accordingly.
These reflections may lead to a sense of hopelessness and 
even nihilism, but we should not confuse a political dilem-
ma with categorical impossibility. Suppose there were liter-
ally guns at the temples of senior policy makers, set to go 
off in 5 years in the absence of emerging evidence of popula-
tion health improvement and in 10 years in the absence of 
concrete improvement. I, for one, have no doubt they would 
survive. If nearly $800 billion can be authorized in months 
to stimulate the economy (12), imagine the effect of a small 
fraction of that amount spent on universal child care, Head 
Start,  micro-lending,  tuition  vouchers,  subsidized  fruits 
and vegetables, massive increases in supervised physical 
activity, and inner-city health clinic expansion.
Perhaps  we  should  tailor  our  approach  to  the  reality 
that population health is ultimately local, a function of 
community well-being and ingenuity. If communities are 
the mechanisms of action, we may need to let them fig-
ure it out for themselves, supported by community-level 
incentives. The California Endowment (13) has funded 14   
communities to pursue goals such as reduced childhood 
obesity, increased school attendance, reduced youth vio-
lence, and a “health home” for all. Suppose the president 
or Congress offered municipalities large prizes for achiev-
ing concrete health gains in a decade — say, a check for 
$100 million for a community of 100,000, or $1,000 per 
capita, payable on January 1, 2022 (baseline data would be 
gathered in 2011, and the clock would start ticking 1 year 
later). Methodologic issues would have to be addressed, 
but these are not insurmountable. Such incentives might 
galvanize coalitions of leaders, business people, educators, 
and community groups to take population health seriously. 
If the whole country got the maximum bonus, the federal 
government would pay $300 billion (300 million people × 
$1,000), or $30 billion per year. That’s barely the round-
ing error on the size of the 2009 US economic stimulus 
package, and the very structure of the investment would 
guarantee an excellent return on investment in terms of 
both health and productivity.
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